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ABSTRACT. 
Financialisation of developed countries includes increased lending to individuals as well 
as adoption of investment banking by commercial banks, thus contributing directly to the 
crisis of 2007-9. Financialisation has acquired an international aspect since the 1990s, 
primarily through liberalised capital flows. In the 2000s international financialisation has 
resulted in net capital flows from developing to developed countries, thus imposing 
substantial costs on the former, while subsidising the USA as leading issuer of quasi-
world-money. International financialisation has also spurred domestic financialisation in 
developing countries through development of bond markets and foreign bank entry. 
Developing countries have been drawn into the crisis as current accounts declined and 
short-term capital flows were reversed.  
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INTRODUCTION.1 
 
The global economic turmoil that began in August 2007 is a crisis of financialised 
capitalism. The crisis sprang out of the financial sector of the USA and the UK - the 
leading countries of financialisation - and entailed failure of the principal components of 
international banking. Through financial and trade mechanisms, it became a global 
recession affecting developed countries in which financialisation has made less 
domestic headway, such as Germany and Japan. The crisis then drew in a range of 
developing countries via the mechanisms of global trade and finance. This aspect of the 
crisis is the point of departure of this paper, affording an opportunity to analyse 
financialisation in the context of developing countries.    
 
A necessary first step is to explain what is meant by financialisation, a term that has 
been increasingly used but without common agreement regarding its content. This 
essay draws on classical Marxist political economy and considers financialisation to be 
a structural transformation of core capitalist economies that has gathered momentum 
since the crisis of 1973-4.2 In the first instance, financialisation stands for the rapid 
growth of the sphere of circulation, while the sphere of production has continued to face 
problems of profitability and productivity. Spurred by technological advance and the 
lifting of regulations during the last three decades, finance has grown enormously in 
terms of activities, markets, institutions and profits.  
 
As finance expanded, relations between industrial enterprises, financial institutions and 
workers were transformed. These changes determine more precisely the content of 
financialisation. Thus, large industrial enterprises have become proficient at raising 
external finance in open financial markets, thereby acquiring financial functions and 
lessening their reliance on banks. There has been, in other words, financialisation of 
productive capital. Consequently, banks have sought new fields of profitability, two of 
which stand out.3 First, banks have generated profits by mediating transactions in open 
markets. As a result, commercial banks have come increasingly to acquire investment 
banking functions. Second, banks have made profits by turning toward individual 
workers and others, for instance, by providing mortgages and unsecured loans.  
                                                          
1
 Thanks are due to several members of Research in Money and Finance at SOAS for critical comments 
and discussions over a period of months. Special mention should be made of Juan Pablo Painceira 
whose work has been important in developing some of the ideas put forth here. All errors are my 
responsibility. 
2
 This approach to financialisation is discussed in Lapavitsas (2009, 2010) and draws on the output of the 
network Research in Money and Finance, see especially Dos Santos (2009, 2010).  
3
 In this connection banks are a proxy for financial institutions. There is no doubt that financial institutions 
have proliferated in unprecedented ways in recent years, but banks remain the core of the financial 
system. 
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The new sources of bank profits are associated with what might be called the 
financialisation of the personal income of workers and others. During the last three 
decades there has been gradual withdrawal of public provision across a range of fields, 
such as housing, health, education, and so on. Growing reliance on private provision, 
coupled with stagnant real wages, has led to increased worker indebtedness to banks 
and other institutions. Meanwhile, retreat of public provision in pensions together with 
institutional and legal reform - including taxation - have channelled worker savings 
toward open financial markets across a range of developed countries. Banks have 
engaged in lending to individuals as well as handling assets arising out of personal 
income, thus earning interest spreads, fees and commissions. The extraction of 
financial profit directly out of wages and salaries, including from the poorest layers of 
workers, has elsewhere been called financial expropriation (Lapavitsas 2009). 
 
These features of financialisation refer mostly to the domestic transformation of 
developed economies. Needless to say, the institutions of monetary and credit policy 
have also changed greatly, particularly the role of central banks. Furthermore, 
governance of corporate enterprises has been transformed, with emphasis on 
‘shareholder value’, share prices and short-term results. Financialisation has finally had 
broader distributional, ethical and moral repercussions across society. Still, the 
characteristic features of financialisation across developed countries are not 
homogeneous, reflecting institutional, historical and political factors, including norms of 
business and personal income expenditure.  
 
What matters more for the purposes of this article, however, are the international 
aspects of financialisation. This is a complex issue, ranging from the accounting 
standards of global financial transactions, to the altered role of international 
organisations, including the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, to exchange rate policy 
and adoption of inflation targeting across the developing world, to the functioning of the 
dollar as quasi-world-money. The current crisis has touched upon these dimensions of 
financialisation, as was been made apparent in early accounts of its unfolding (Wade 
2008, Gowan 2009).  
 
Yet, the links between domestic financialisation in developed countries and international 
financialisation affecting developing countries remain unclear. These links derive in 
large part from the international capital flows between developed and developing 
countries. In this light, the role of international capital flows in the bubble of 2001-7 and 
in the ensuing crisis is considered in some detail below. It is shown that capital flows 
were important to sustaining the bubble in developed countries, while providing an 
effective subsidy to the USA as main provider of quasi-world-money. Moreover, 
international capital flows appear to have induced domestic financialisation in several 
developing countries, led by expansion of domestic bond markets and entry of foreign 
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banks. Capital flows and domestic financialisation have contributed to the emergence of 
crisis across a range of developing countries. 
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 considers the main features of the bubble 
of 2001-7 that laid the ground for the current crisis. The bubble was an outcome of 
financialisation in so far as it emerged from the sphere of finance while having a 
marginal effect on productive accumulation. Specifically, the bubble arose primarily out 
of lending for private housing accompanied by intensive financial engineering 
(securitisation). Both the bubble and the ensuing crisis have thus reflected the structural 
shift of financial institutions toward personal income and mediating in financial markets. 
 
Section 3 considers international financialisation and its impact on the domestic 
economy of developing countries. The issue is examined first in terms of capital and 
trade flows in the 2000s, showing that global capital has been flowing from poor to rich 
countries due to reserve accumulation. Apart from the benefits this trend has brought to 
the USA as the main issuer of quasi-world-money, it has also boosted domestic 
financialisation in developing countries. This has been exacerbated by entry of foreign 
banks.  
 
Section 4 then turns to the impact of the crisis on developing and examines current 
account deterioration, short-term capital inflows and reserve accumulation. There is 
considerable variation among developing countries in this respect, which accounts for 
the differential impact of the crisis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. BUBBLE AND CRISIS OF FINANCIALISATION, 2001-7. 
 
The bubble of 2001-7 began as US monetary policy was loosened drastically after the 
collapse of stock market speculation during 1999-2000, bringing official Federal 
Reserve rates close to 1% during 2002-3. The epicentre of expansion lay in the US 
housing market, but other housing markets were also affected, notably in the UK. On 
the back of house price inflation, other financial asset prices also rose in the USA and 
elsewhere, creating a general financial bubble. The bubble grew as private banks 
moved into the US housing market, while engaging in financial engineering, above all, 
securitisation. It kept expanding after 2004 – when US interest rates began to rise – 
partly because of substantial capital inflows from developing countries.  
Capital inflows from developing countries are considered in subsequent sections, but 
figure 1 shows the combined impact of private bank entry and financial engineering in 
the US housing market.   
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<Fig. 1 here> 
 
Mortgage origination expanded rapidly on the wake of interest rate reductions in 2001. 
But growth in the prime market slackened after 2003, leading to a decline in total 
originations. Volumes remained at a high level, however, as subprime mortgages rose 
precisely at that time. Rapid subprime growth was possible because 80% of these 
mortgages were securitised, as is apparent from the diagram. In short, financial 
engineering enabled private banks to enter the housing market, even reaching 
previously excluded sections of US workers and thus sustaining growth of aggregate 
mortgage lending.4 
 
The bubble, then, was partly due to the gradual transformation of banks in the course of 
financialisation, a process that is apparent for US banks. Namely, banks have turned 
increasingly toward investment banking, i.e. toward mediating in open financial markets 
to earn fees, commissions, and trading profits. This constitutes a significant change 
from traditional commercial banking which has typically involved gathering deposits to 
make customer-specific loans that were kept on the balance sheet. Securitisation 
represents a sharp acceleration of the trend toward investment banking, widely adopted 
by commercial banks since the 1990s.  
 
Banks have also turned toward personal income as a source of profits, including the 
income of the poorest. Lending for personal mortgages in the 2000s represented an 
unprecedented sharpening of this trend for formal finance, which was made possible by 
two factors. The first was technological development which allowed general use of 
‘credit scoring’ as well as risk management on the balance sheet. The second was the 
acquisition of investment banking functions by commercial banks, specifically the 
practice of borrowing short-term funds to finance the transformation of idiosynchratic 
loans into securities. 5 
 
It is worth stressing that the bubble was not a period of strong growth of consumption 
and investment, contrary to perceptions prevalent in public debate. Figure 2 shows that 
consumption as proportion of GDP remained stagnant during the period - or even 
declined in the UK and Germany – though remaining at very high historical levels in the 
USA. Weakness of consumption was related to lack of growth in real wages during this 
period. However, access of workers to consumer goods was improved as imports from 
Asia rose. Higher productivity growth in newly industrialising developing countries - 
                                                          
4
 For an account of the entry of private finance in previously ‘redlined’ areas of the housing market in the 
USA, thus drawing black and Latino families into the bubble, see Dymski (2009).  
5
 See Lapavitsas (2009) for further discussion of these points. 
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primarily China – allowed workers in mature capitalist countries to maintain 
consumption levels. 6  But there was no consumption boom during the bubble.  
 
<Fig. 2 here> 
 
Indifferent consumption was matched by weak investment performance, particularly in 
the USA. Figure 3 shows that there was no investment boom in mature capitalist 
countries during the bubble of 2001-7. Rather, productive capitalist accumulation 
exhibited considerable weakness in the USA and other leading developing countries. 
This is in sharp contrast to the Japanese bubble of the late 1980s, which witnessed the 
last great splurge of domestic investment by Japanese enterprises. By the same token, 
the gearing of non-financial corporations did not rise significantly during 2001-7. The 
crisis of 2007-9 has not been caused by corporate over-indebtedness. 
 
<Fig. 3 here> 
 
What did rise at a remarkable pace during this period, however, was individual 
indebtedness in the USA and the UK, as is shown in figure 4. At the same time, 
individual indebtedness declined in Germany and Japan, and the reason obviously is 
that there was no housing bubble in those countries. Note that unsecured borrowing 
(primarily for consumption) did not rise strongly - and even declined after 2005 - in the 
USA and the UK. The ratio of debt to disposable income in the UK and the USA rose to 
unprecedented heights primarily because of mortgage borrowing. Given stagnant real 
wages, it is obvious that such extraordinary levels of personal debt were going to lead to 
problems as soon as interest rates rose significantly. This is indeed what happened in 
2006, starting the slide toward crisis.  
 
<Fig. 4 here> 
 
Against this background, banks and the financial system in general expanded 
enormously in both the UK and the USA, though much less so in Germany and Japan. 
Figure 5 shows that UK bank assets rose to almost five times GDP, while US banks 
rose less prominently. The reason for the latter is the emergence of vast ‘shadow 
banking’ in the USA, including institutions that engaged in mortgage and other activities 
while being partially related to banks. Nevertheless, banks remained at the heart of 
financial expansion even in the USA by generating credit for others and sustaining flows 
                                                          
6
 For comparisons of rates of growth of productivity see Amiti and Stiroh (2007).  
Lapavitsas, Costas. Financialisation embroils developing countries. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 108-139 
114 
in money markets. It is no surprise that US banks found themselves at the centre of the 
crisis after 2007. 
 
<Fig. 5 here> 
 
As was mentioned earlier, banks undertook this enormous expansion by adopting 
investment banking practices. Mixing commercial with investment banking has had 
severe implications for bank performance and directly contributed to the outbreak of 
crisis. For, investment banking has different liquidity and solvency requirements from 
commercial banking. The latter relies heavily on deposit inflows for liquidity, while 
making customer-specific loans. It is necessary, therefore, for commercial banks to hold 
substantial capital in order to ensure solvency and confidence among liability holders. 
The former relies heavily on the money market for liquidity, while dealing in tradable 
securities. The capital requirements of investment banks are correspondingly lower.  
 
In the course of the bubble commercial banks became heavily dependent on the money 
market for liquidity, while transforming customer-specific loans (mortgages) into tradable 
securities. This allowed banks to ‘churn’ their capital, thus raising their profitability. 
Moreover, since loans were rapidly securitised in complex ways that deployed 
computationally-intensive models, the process of information collection and risk 
management by banks lost much of its substantive content. The result was that housing 
loans in the USA around the middle of the 2000s were made on the flimsiest of 
foundations to borrowers of very low creditworthiness. Not surprisingly, as interest rates 
climbed in 2006-7, subprime mortgages started to default in large numbers. Thus, 
seemingly tradable securities created by banks became completely illiquid, while fresh 
funds from the money market dried up. Bank depositors, meanwhile, threatened to 
withdraw deposits en masse, most dramatically in the case of Northern Rock in the UK. 
The result was that banks found themselves in the midst of a systemic crisis of liquidity 
and solvency.   
 
The recession that unfolded in 2008 was spurred by the banking crisis and the ensuing 
tightening of credit. Securitised pools of credit completely disappeared as financial 
institutions abandoned securitisation. Meanwhile, banks tightened credit provision in an 
attempt to improve liquidity and solvency. Laden with debt and confronted with 
collapsing housing markets, households drastically reduced borrowing, to the point of 
nearly eliminating all fresh borrowing by households in the USA toward the end of 2008. 
The result of these developments was collapse of demand, which has impacted on firm 
inventories, output and employment. By extension, exporters were severely hit, above 
all, in Germany and Japan, but also in developing countries, leading to general 
recession.  
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To recap, the crisis of 2007-9 is an outcome of financialisation. The crisis emerged after 
the burst of the gigantic bubble of 2001-7, which centred on the housing market of the 
USA and to a lesser extent the UK. Productive accumulation was only marginally 
affected by the extraordinary growth of finance during 2001-7. The bubble was caused, 
on the one hand, by loose monetary policy that resulted in cheap credit. On the other, it 
resulted from the turn of banks toward personal income as source of profits, while at the 
same time engaging in financial engineering.  
 
Banks and other financial institutions expanded enormously during this period. Yet, the 
ultimate source of repayment for much of the credit advanced was worker income, 
which remained stagnant. The ensuing financial crisis forced rapid adjustments of 
liquidity and solvency for banks as well as attempts to lower indebtedness by workers. 
The recession that has emerged is likely to have significant effects on production and 
employment, thus also second order effects on finance.  
 
2. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIALISATION IN THE COURSE OF THE 
BUBBLE. 
 
The bubble of 2001-7 and the ensuing crisis have cast light on the international aspects 
of financialisation. As was mentioned above, financialisation is primarily a process 
occurring within developed countries. But financialisation has also affected the 
developing world, entailing structural transformation of financial systems as well as 
altering the interaction between domestic economy and global finance. At the same time 
financialisation of developing countries has also had specific features reflecting, first, 
the dominant role of developed countries in the world economy and, second, the mode 
of integration of particular developing countries with world markets.  
 
The beginnings of financialisation in developing countries can probably be found in 
financial liberalisation in the 1970s, which lifted price and quantity controls in domestic 
financial systems. Following mediocre results in terms of investment, efficiency and 
stability, liberalisation gradually acquired further features, including introduction of stock 
markets. By the late 1980s financial liberalisation had morphed into an integrated pro-
market development strategy, the Washington Consensus. Guided and enforced by the 
World Bank and the IMF, the Consensus led developing countries to alter the balance of 
domestic finance away from bank-based, relational, government-controlled toward 
market-based, arms length, private institutions and mechanisms.7 
 
                                                          
7
 For further analysis of several aspects of the Washington Consensus from a Marxist and heterodox 
standpoint see Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus (2001) and Lapavitsas and Noguchi (2005). 
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A fundamental component of the Washington Consensus has been to open domestic 
economies to international capital markets, typically on the grounds that capital would 
flow from rich to poor countries, thus promoting development. However, it is shown 
below that in the 2000s, as developing countries became more closely integrated with 
world capital markets, precisely the reverse took place. Openness to international 
capital flows, moreover, drew developing countries into both the bubble of 2001-7 and 
the ensuing crisis. International financialisation has thus had highly unstable outcomes 
for developing countries.   
 
A further component of the Washington Consensus has been strongly to encourage 
entry of foreign banks into developing countries. The rationale typically was that foreign 
banks would improve efficiency while meeting domestic credit shortages.8 Yet, entry by 
foreign banks into developing countries since the 1990s has had unexpected results, 
including the redirection of bank lending toward personal income, thus strengthening 
domestic financialisation. The presence of foreign banks, furthermore, has affected the 
slide toward crisis in several developing countries. For these reasons the crisis of 2007-
9 represents a major blow for the Washington Consensus. This has been clearly 
understood by its advocates, who have leapt to its defence (Demirguc-Kunt and Serven 
2009).  
 
In the following sections, financialisation of developing countries is considered in 
connection with capital flows and foreign bank entry. The conclusions are perhaps most 
appropriate for middle income countries in the period that followed the Asian crisis of 
1997-8. It is shown that during the ensuing decade the mode of integration of 
developing countries with the world economy was transformed. As a result of this 
transformation net capital flows became strongly negative, substantial costs were 
imposed on developing countries, and domestic financial markets expanded. Moreover, 
systematic entry by foreign banks has promoted further internal financialisation with 
attendant phenomena that are reminiscent of the transformation of finance in developed 
countries. These developments have played an important role in the bubble of 2001-7, 
while also determining the impact of the crisis on developing countries. 
 
2.1 Capital and trade flows. 
 
The flows of international capital and trade after the Asian crisis of 1997-8 are important 
to the unfolding of financialisation.  
 
                                                          
8
 An influential formulation of this view can be found in Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001). 
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<Fig. 6 here> 
  
A striking feature of Figure 6 is the growing divergence between private and official 
capital flows after 2002. During 2002-2007 private flows recovered strongly from their 
collapse at the end of the 1990s. Meanwhile, net official flows became negative, partly 
because aid flows were mediocre, but mostly because developing countries repaid 
official debts, especially debts to international organisations accumulated at the end of 
the 1990s. But similarly to the 1990s, the period of expansion in the 2000s has ended 
with collapsing private flows in 2008, although the ensuing crisis is likely to have 
different outcomes for reasons discussed below. Figure 7 affords further insight by 
showing the composition of private flows.  
 
<Fig. 7 here> 
 
Foreign Direct Investment has been by far the most vigorous component of private 
flows, sustaining itself even after the Asian crisis. FDI has so far successfully ridden the 
wave of the current crisis. On this evidence, productive capacity has continued to shift 
to developing countries throughout the last decade, primarily to Asia. This seems to be 
a firm underlying trend of the world economy.  
 
Portfolio flows, on the other hand, have been weak and fluctuating throughout the 
period. Other short-term flows, including bank lending, remained weak until 2005, but 
during the last years of the bubble they recovered strongly, even if growth was far from 
uniform across developing countries, as is shown below. However, the expansion of 
short-term flows proved extremely precarious, and was sharply reversed once turmoil 
hit global finance in 2008. Strong growth and rapid decline of short-term flows were an 
important financial mechanism through which developing countries were drawn into the 
crisis.    
 
Figure 6 also shows that, during this period, substantial current account surpluses 
emerged among developing countries. Developing countries have become more closely 
integrated into the world market since the 1980s as policies of trade liberalisation were 
generally adopted. This holds even for low-income countries in Africa and Asia, where 
the ratio of exports to GDP in 2007 stood at roughly 35% for the former and 30% for the 
latter (Karshenas 2009). Naturally, the behaviour of the current account has varied 
significantly among developing countries in the 2000s, depending on trade 
specialisation. However, two broad groups can be identified. The first comprises 
countries that have gained substantial share in international manufacturing, most 
prominently China. A significant part of their surpluses were exports to developed 
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countries, including consumer goods to the USA and Western Europe. The second 
comprises commodities exporters, most strongly oil exporters, including Russia and the 
Gulf countries, but also exporters of industrial metals. Rising commodity prices around 
the middle of the decade resulted in substantial trade surpluses, though less so for 
agricultural raw materials.  
 
Generally speaking, expanding trade flows during the 2000s strengthened the 
integration of developing countries into the world market. By the same token, 
developing countries have become more vulnerable to global trade shocks. Since the 
crisis of 2007 led to collapsing demand in developed countries, manufacturing and 
commodities exporters among developing countries faced declining demand. The burst 
of the bubble in commodity prices in 2008, with the ensuing collapse of prices, 
intensified the effect on developing countries, thus creating conditions of recession. But 
the impact of the trade shock on developing countries has been far from uniform, as is 
shown in the following sections.  
 
By far the most striking aspect of Figure 6, however, has been the growth of reserve 
holdings by developing countries. Indeed, the accumulation of reserves has been so 
strong that the net global flow of capital has been reversed. Thus, during the 2000s, 
capital has flowed from poor to rich countries on a large scale, an evidently pathological 
outcome of financial liberalisation that is contrary to the precepts of the Washington 
Consensus. 9 Reserve accumulation and the net outflow of capital from poor to rich 
countries have continued in the course of the crisis of 2007-9, though the pace has 
slackened.  
 
Table 1 gives further detail on reserve accumulation by developing countries:  
 
<Table 1 here> 
 
China dominates reserve holdings, possessing more than a third of total reserves, and 
reflecting persistent current account surpluses. Significant other holders include oil 
exporters. The most remarkable holder of reserves, however, is surely Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which held roughly $163.5bn in 2008, an increase of roughly five-fold during the 
period. Even impoverished Africa contributed to the net flow of capital from poor to rich 
countries.   
 
                                                          
9
 Hence the process has caused some mainstream bafflement (Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian 2007). 
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There are several reasons why developing countries have been accumulating reserves 
in the 2000s. The shock of sudden reversal of private capital flows in 1997-8 
encouraged adoption of a policy of ‘self-insurance’. 10 Given that there was no structural 
change of global finance after the crises of the late 1990s, developing countries were 
left to fend for themselves in an environment of re-strengthened private flows in the 
2000s. In that context, developing countries have exhibited some reluctance to rely on 
short-term and portfolio flows, though after 2005 several became heavily dependent. 
More significantly, developing countries sought ways of protecting themselves from the 
potentially disastrous implications of flow reversals, particularly after short-term 
borrowing began to rise again.  
 
‘Self-insurance’ also applies to countries that have not generated regular current 
account surpluses but have still registered significant short-term capital inflows. 
Remarkably, it also applies to very poor countries that have relied on regular inflows of 
aid during this period, notably in Africa. Such ‘self-insurance’ has been actively enforced 
by the World Bank and the IMF, who have been monitoring the levels of reserves 
relative to exports and domestic monetary growth of even the poorest developing 
countries (Painceira 2009).  
 
Reserve accumulation has also resulted from exchange rate policies. On the one hand, 
several developing countries with current account surpluses have attempted to prevent 
their exchange rates from rising. Pegging the exchange rate for trade purposes is a key 
reason why China has accumulated vast reserves. On the other hand, macroeconomic 
policies of inflation targeting were often forced on developing countries as part of the 
Washington Consensus. Inflation targeting has entailed pegging exchange rates relative 
to the dollar or other major currencies in an apparent effort to control imported inflation. 
To be able to defend the peg, developing countries have had to accumulate reserves. 
By the same token, several developing countries introduced high domestic interest 
rates, even resulting in rising exchange rates during this period. This encouraged forms 
of ‘carry trade’, that is, domestic residents borrowing abroad in order to invest in 
financial assets in developing countries (Painceira 2009). As borrowing abroad rose, so 
did the pressure to hold reserves.   
 
2.2 Financialisation spurred by reserve accumulation. 
 
The precise composition of international reserves is not known, but there is little doubt 
that the bulk - perhaps two thirds - comprises US dollars. The policy of reserve 
accumulation thus amounts to developing countries storing dollars – a total reserve 
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 An unfortunate euphemism for a policy forced on developing countries by the absence of structural 
change in world finance.  
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equivalent of about $6tr in 2008 - in order to be able to participate in international trade 
and confront financial flows. In Marxist terms, it is a policy of intensified hoarding of the 
dollar as quasi-world-money. 11 The extent of such hoarding by developing countries is 
unprecedented in the history of the world market, in view especially of the US dollar 
being ultimately backed by nothing more than US government securities. In effect, 
developing countries have been obliged to accumulate vast hoards of quasi-world-
money that rests solely on the promise of the US government to pay an (intrinsically 
valueless) dollar for every dollar of its debt.  
 
In these circumstances, the safest way for developing countries to accumulate dollars 
has been to purchase US public debt. Thus, the expansion of reserves by developing 
countries during the 2000s resulted in a growing share of US public securities in the 
possession of foreign financial institutions, primarily central banks.  
 
<Fig. 8 here> 
 
Specifically, an increasing proportion of US Treasury securities have been held abroad 
in the 2000s, rising from 35.2% of the total in 2000 to 56.9% in 2007. Even stronger 
than this, however, has been growth in the foreign holdings of long-term securities 
issued by the Government Sponsored Agencies that are the backbone of the US 
housing market. The proportion of GSA securities held abroad rose from 7.3% of the 
total in 2000 to 21.4% in 2007. Foreign buyers have treated these as quasi-public-debt, 
a perception that was fully borne out by the rush of the US government to nationalise 
‘Fannie Mae’ and ‘Freddie Mac’ at the peak of the crisis in late summer 2008. Reserve 
accumulation has thus had a direct connection to the US housing bubble. 
The impact of reserve accumulation on developed countries has been profound, though 
its analysis requires caution. At the peak of the US housing bubble in 2006, the net 
aggregate flow of capital from poor to rich countries stood at $700bn, rising to just over 
$800bn in 2008. These were significant sums relative to other international capital flows, 
and certainly represented massive outflows of capital from developing countries. But 
their size was rather modest compared to the fresh flows of credit in the US financial 
system, and even in the US housing market. The annual average of subprime mortgage 
originations alone was close to $600bn during 2004-6. Thus, the course of the US 
bubble was determined primarily by domestic credit conditions as well as by financial 
engineering by banks, as was discussed in section 2.  
 
                                                          
11
 World money is a particular function of money within Marxist theory that refers to money as hoarding 
and paying instrument in the world market (Marx, 1976, ch. 3). The traditional form of world money has 
been commodity money, i.e. gold, which is why the dollar is referred to as quasi-world-money in this 
article. 
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On the other hand, net inflows from developing countries, which became truly sizeable 
only after 2004, as Figure 6 shows, probably had a significant impact on US credit 
conditions at the margin. This is all the more so since they rose to prominence at a time 
when the Federal Reserve began to raise interest rates. It is reasonable to surmise that 
rising net capital flows from developing countries – primarily China – kept yields low in 
developed country markets, thus protracting the bubble. 
 
The impact of reserve accumulation on developing countries, meanwhile, has been 
even more pronounced. For one thing, rising hoards of quasi-world-money have 
entailed substantial costs for developing countries. Given that much of this hoarding 
takes the form of US public securities, the growth of reserves has represented net 
lending by developing countries to the USA. These are funds that could have been 
invested domestically to support development. Put differently, the international 
arrangements of capital flows and world money have created an unprecedented source 
of gain for the US economy. Developing countries have been implicitly subsidising the 
hegemonic power in the world economy purely because it issues the dominant form of 
(valueless) quasi-world-money.  
 
The cost of reserve holding for developing countries can be gauged through a variety of 
methods. 12 One way is to focus on countries that have received significant inflows of 
private short-term capital, and were then obliged to keep sizeable reserves in order to 
offset the risk of sudden reversal. In effect, these developing countries have received 
significant flows of borrowing from abroad - incurred by private enterprises - and 
proceeded to ‘insure’ it by lending officially to the USA. But the borrowing was at 
commercial rates of interest, while the ‘insurance’ at much lower official US rates. In a 
pioneering study, Rodrik (2006) estimated the social cost of this policy at perhaps 1% of 
developing country GDP.  
Note, that the beneficiaries of this largesse by the global poor include not only the USA 
but also private borrowers in developing countries. For, private enterprises and others in 
developing countries were able to borrow abroad at rates that were typically lower than 
domestic rates, while ‘insuring’ their actions via costs that were effectively borne by 
society as a whole. Borrowers would frequently use the proceeds to invest in domestic 
financial assets, in a form of ‘carry trade’ that accrued directly the benefits of interest 
rate spreads. Reserve accumulation, in other words, induced internal differentiation in 
developing countries, further discussed below. 
 
For countries that run significant current account surpluses, or for poor countries in 
receipt of foreign aid, the cost can be gauged in a different way that focuses on 
monetary policy (Wijnholds and Sondergaad, 2007, Aizenman and Glick, 2008). 
Acquisition of reserves by central banks is typically sterilised to prevent domestic 
                                                          
12
 Without even counting the risk of capital losses, if the dollar depreciated significantly. 
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monetary growth that could jeopardise inflation targets. But the liabilities thereby issued 
by central banks typically carry domestic rates, which tend to be significantly higher than 
the official rates on the foreign public assets also acquired by central banks. The spread 
is a cost that is carried by society as a whole. The main beneficiary is, once again, the 
USA, but there are also significant domestic implications for the financial systems of 
developing countries.  
 
The domestic counterpart to reserve accumulation, therefore, has been increased 
domestic issuing of public securities across a range of developing countries. Domestic 
bond markets have grown strongly in developing countries since the middle of the 
1990s, as is shown in Figure 9. 
 
<Fig. 9 here> 
 
Not surprisingly, domestic bond markets have grown most strongly in Asia, which also 
holds by far the largest reserves. But they have also become substantial in Latin 
America and elsewhere. The growth of bond markets represents increased financial 
deepening in developing countries and is an aspect of advancing domestic 
financialisation. Liquid public securities have provided a foundation for a variety of 
domestic financial transactions as well as for emergence of new financial institutions in 
developing countries. Liquid domestic markets have also made it possible for domestic 
banks increasingly to engage in activities that resemble those of developed countries. 
This trend has been accelerated by the entry of foreign banks in developing countries, 
discussed below. Thus, reserve accumulation, which arose due to the international 
aspect of financialisation, has boosted domestic financialisation in developing countries.  
 
2.3 Financialisation accelerated by foreign bank entry. 
 
The acceleration of financialisation as domestic financial markets have expanded is 
easier to see in middle income countries. A decisive element in this process has been 
foreign bank entry, which has taken place across developing countries in the course of 
the last decade. Significant proportions of total banking assets are now foreign-owned 
even in low income countries, most notably in Africa where foreign ownership 
constitutes more than two thirds of banking assets in ten countries. 13 There has also 
been pronounced foreign bank entry in Central and Eastern Europe. It appears that 
banking was exceptionally profitable in larger middle-income countries during this 
period, thus attracting foreign entry (WEO 2008).  
                                                          
13
 Namely, Benin, Cape Verde, Togo, Uganda, The Gambia, Mozambique, Zambia, Guinea, Djibouti and 
Lesotho (Karhenas 2009). 
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Entry of foreign banks into developing countries has complex outcomes on growth as 
well as on the performance of the financial sector. Its advocates expect the superior 
efficiency of foreign banks to improve the performance of domestic financial systems as 
well as ameliorating persistent credit shortages for small and medium enterprises 
(Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2001, Clarke, Cull, Sanchez, and Peria 2003). 
Even mainstream economists, however, have doubts on whether the skills of foreign 
banks in assessing ‘hard’ information are appropriate for lending to small and medium 
enterprise in developing countries, which tends to rely on ‘soft’ information 
(Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta 2006).  
 
For the purposes of this article, a notable outcome of foreign bank entry has been the 
introduction of lending practices that aim at personal income, particularly in middle 
income countries in the 2000s. Foreign banks have expanded provision of mortgage 
and credit-card lending as well as related financial services in a range of developing 
countries. Furthermore, growing volumes of lending and high profitability seem to have 
attracted domestic banks into the field, thus accelerating the financialisation of personal 
income. Personal indebtedness has emerged as a significant feature of several 
developing countries. The evidence is still patchy, but the pace of change has been 
startling in several middle-income countries.  
 
Consider, for instance, Mexico and Turkey, both paradigmatic instances of middle-
income countries with strong foreign bank entry. In Mexico, roughly 80% of bank assets 
are currently in foreign hands, particularly after a wave of mergers and acquisitions 
around 2000. Banorte is the only sizeable bank that remains under domestic ownership. 
Table 2 shows the proportion of consumer loans in total loans by the largest five banks 
at the time of mergers and a few years later. The turn of banks toward personal income 
as source of profits is apparent: 
 
<Table 2 here> 
 
Similar results obtain for Turkey, where the entry of foreign banks began in full earnest 
following the crisis of 2001 and the ensuing stabilization measures. Foreign direct 
investment increased very rapidly during 2002-7, exceeding $19bn in 2007 
(Undersecretariat of the Treasury, Turkey, 2008). The financial sector was the main 
recipient of these flows mostly through mergers and acquisitions. Finance, for instance, 
absorbed almost 60% of the inflow of FDI in 2007. Led by foreign banks, the Turkish 
banking sector has swung sharply toward personal income as a field of lending, 
particularly after 2004. 14 Consumer loans by foreign banks have consistently exceeded 
35% of their total loans since 2004, while the proportion of consumer loans by the 
                                                          
14
 For a fuller discussion of this trend see Ergüneş (2009). 
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banking system as a whole rose from about 13% in 2002 to about 33% in 2007 (BAT 
2008). Housing loans rose, but the increase was most pronounced in credit card and 
related loans. Figure 10 shows the trajectory of individual debt and interest payments: 
 
<Fig. 10 here> 
 
Given that real wages have been stagnating, or even declining, in Turkey during the 
2000s, the result of banks turning toward personal income has been extremely rapid 
growth of individual indebtedness. Meanwhile, there is no evidence that small and 
medium enterprises have benefited significantly from foreign bank entry. The longer-
term implications for growth and development are far from clear.  
 
To recap, the 2000s have been a period of accelerated integration of developing 
countries in world trade and finance, though with significant variations. This has lent an 
international as well as domestic aspect to financialisation in developing countries. 
Specifically, the 2000s have witnessed strong FDI and increasing short-term lending, 
but indifferent portfolio flows from developed to developing countries. At the same time, 
developing countries registered large current account surpluses through rising 
commodity prices and manufacturing exports. Above all, there has been enormous 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by developing countries, resulting in 
negative net capital flows. In effect, poor countries have financed a select few among 
the rich countries - mostly the USA - throughout the 2000s.  
Put differently, international financialisation has led to developing countries holding 
enormous hoards of dollars (and a few other currencies) as quasi-world-money. The 
costs to developing countries have been substantial, gauged either as the spread 
between domestic and foreign interest rates, or as costs of sterilization by central 
banks. In effect, developing countries have been providing an implicit subsidy to some 
developed countries, mostly to the hegemonic issuer of quasi-world-money, the USA. 
The net inflows of capital from developing countries, meanwhile, allowed the housing 
bubble to continue apace in the USA after 2004.  
 
Equally important is the growth of domestic financial markets fostered by reserve 
accumulation in developing countries, thus also boosting domestic financialisation. The 
latter has been further spurred by foreign bank entry which brought increasing 
proportions of bank assets in developing countries under foreign ownership. It appears 
that in middle-income countries foreign banks have led a shift of the entire banking 
system toward personal income as source of financial profits. Domestic financial 
expropriation seems to have taken root in several developing countries, with significant 
implications for individual indebtedness. 
Lapavitsas, Costas. Financialisation embroils developing countries. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 108-139 
125 
3. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAUGHT IN THE BURST OF THE 
BUBBLE. 
 
The impact of the current crisis on developing countries is now easier to ascertain, if 
only in broad outline. It was shown in section 2 that the crisis arose due to 
financialisation in the USA and the UK, entailing large-scale lending to the poorest 
layers of workers while banks engaged in financial engineering associated with 
investment banking. The financial crisis became a general recession as demand 
collapsed and credit was tightened. Developing countries were caught in the crisis 
through several mechanisms associated with international financialisation.  
 
In the first instance developing countries were hit by collapsing exports as demand 
disappeared in developed countries. Commodity exporters were also heavily affected as 
commodity prices fell rapidly in the second half of 2008. Current accounts thus 
worsened significantly across a range of developing countries. However, the intensity of 
the trade blow has varied according to the mode of integration of particular countries 
with the world economy.  
 
Figure 11 shows the deterioration of the current account of several key developing 
countries in 2008-9. Significant deficits emerged for Poland, Brazil, India, while the 
exports of China also came under pressure.   
 
<Fig. 11 here> 
 
The crisis also affected developing countries through financial mechanisms, which to an 
extent overlapped with trade mechanisms. Thus, as liquidity disappeared among 
international banks, trade credit became scarce, affecting exports by developing 
countries. More pressingly, short-term capital flows were reversed as global credit 
conditions became tight, as was shown in Figure 7. Once again, the impact of the 
reversal of short-term flows varied according to the mode of integration with the world 
economy.  
 
The most severe outcomes appeared when the reversal of short-term flows combined 
with rapid deterioration of the current account. The result was emergence of currency 
crises, reminiscent of the Asian crisis of 1997-8, which necessitated emergency 
borrowing and the intervention of international organizations, most pressingly in Eastern 
Europe. The accumulation of reserves in the previous period proved of limited 
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usefulness on those occasions. The complexity of the crisis was even greater in 
countries in which there had been significant domestic financialisation led by foreign 
bank entry, as was again often the case in Eastern Europe. Large domestic 
indebtedness combined with tighter international credit conditions to accelerate the 
deterioration of the domestic economy.  
 
General trends as well as major differences among developing countries can be 
identifying by using aggregate IMF data that refer to standard regions, at some risk of 
losing significant detail. Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 compare and contrast the Middle 
East, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and Emerging Asia. Thus, the 
worsening of the current account was most notable in Central and Eastern Europe as 
well as in Latin America. In contrast, the Middle East continued to register increasing 
surpluses even in 2008, while Emerging Asia remained broadly stable.  
 
<Fig. 12, 13, 14, 15 here> 
 
The shock of current account deterioration varied among the different areas. Things 
were at their worst in Central and Eastern Europe, which had registered deficits 
throughout the 2000s, and altogether failed to participate in the general trend of 
developing countries toward current account surpluses. Latin America was a distant 
second, switching to deficit in 2008, though on a significant smaller scale.  
 
The impact of the current account shock also depended on the size of reserves held. 
The trend toward reserve accumulation continued in 2008, as was mentioned above, 
albeit at a reduced pace. However, the distribution of reserves has varied substantially 
among developing countries. Central and Eastern Europe was in a weak position, 
holding roughly half the reserves of Latin America and a fraction of the reserves of 
Developing Asia and the Middle East.  
 
But the decisive element that determined the drift of developing countries toward crisis 
in 2008 was the extent to which they had come to depend on short-term capital flows in 
the preceding period. Figure 7 showed that such flows remained weak for most of the 
2000s, though they rose sharply after 2005 as the bubble in the USA countries began to 
reach its peak. Still, there was considerable variation among developing countries in this 
respect. Central and Eastern Europe was the only region in the world that registered 
significant and rising short-term flows throughout the 2000s. Inflows of short-term capital 
were far more modest in other regions, barely rising into positive territory.  
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The sudden reversal of short-term flows in 2008 resulted in extreme difficulty of 
obtaining short-term credit, thus compounding the effect of current account 
deterioration. Countries that held substantial reserves were in a better position to deal 
with the combined blow. Central and Eastern Europe had registered high short-term 
flows in the preceding period, faced pronounced current account deterioration, and held 
lower reserves than elsewhere. During the previous period, furthermore, there had been 
sustained foreign bank entry that promoted domestic financialisation with rising levels of 
individual indebtedness. It is not surprising that the crisis was at its sharpest in Central 
and Eastern Europe, though the underlying reasons were present across developing 
countries.  
 
4. CONCLUSION. 
 
The crisis of 2007-9 arose at the burst of an enormous bubble in real estate and other 
financial assets primarily in the USA. The underlying trends that lead to it are 
characteristic of financialisation in developed countries. They include, above all, 
generalized lending to workers accompanied by financial engineering and adoption of 
investment banking practices by banks. The crisis mutated into a global recession as 
credit shrunk and demand collapsed. At that point it became clear that financialisation 
had embroiled developing countries. 
 
Financialisation in developing countries is, in the first instance, a phenomenon of 
international transactions. Liberalisation of capital flows has integrated developing 
countries more closely into world capital markets since the early 1990s. The Asian crisis 
of 1997-8 did not stop this process, but gave to it a significantly different aspect in the 
2000s. Developing countries were obliged to hoard quasi-world-money in order to be 
able to participate in international capital flows. The unprecedented extent of such 
hoarding resulted in negative net flows of capital, in effect poor financing rich countries - 
primarily the USA. To sustain reserve accumulation, meanwhile, developing countries 
engaged in sterilization. Consequently, international financialisation imposed substantial 
costs on developing countries, since interest rates on foreign exchange reserves were 
generally lower than either international borrowing rates, or domestic public security 
rates. Put differently, developing countries paid an implicit subsidy to the USA as issuer 
of the pre-eminent form of quasi-world-money purely because of taking part in 
international capital flows. 
 
International financialisation, meanwhile, acted as a spur for accelerated domestic 
financialisation, particularly in middle income countries. Sterilisation encouraged growth 
of domestic bond markets, thus providing scope for expansion of domestic financial 
institutions. During the same period large-scale entry of foreign banks led to adoption of 
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practices found in financialised developed countries. In particular, lending to individuals 
for mortgages and consumption has risen prominently in several developing countries, 
resulting in rapid growth of personal debt. Domestic banks have also entered this field. 
The development results of directing credit toward personal income are unclear at 
present.  
 
The impact of the crisis on developing countries has varied according to the mode and 
extent of integration in world trade and capital flows. Developing countries were hit by a 
combination of worsening current account and sudden reversal of short-term capital 
flows. The effect depended on the size of foreign exchange reserves. It also depended 
on entry by foreign banks and the extent of domestic financialisation. Central and 
Eastern Europe represented a particularly acute combination of these pressures. 
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Fig.  1.  US Mortgage Loans, % of GDP 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, various. 
 
Fig. 2. Consumption as % of GDP 
Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, ONS, Bundesbank Flow of Funds, BoJ Flow of Funds 
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Fig 3. Investment as % of GDP 
Source: OECD, Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, ONS 
 
Fig. 4. Individual Debt as % of Disposable Income 
Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, ONS, Bundesbank Flow of Funds, BoJ Flow of Funds 
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Fig. 5. Bank assets as % of GDP 
Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, ONS, Bundesbank Flow of Funds, BoJ Flow of Funds 
 
Fig. 6. Net Global Capital Flows - Emerging and Developing Countries, $bn 
Net capital flows comprise net direct investment, net portfolio investment, and other long- and short-term net investment flows, 
including official and private. Source: WEO, 2009 
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Fig. 7. Private capital flows - Emerging and Developing Countries, $bn 
Source: WEO, 2009 
 
Fig. 8. US public debt held by foreign official institutions, % of US GDP 
Source: Thomson Datastream 
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Fig. 9. Changes in stocks of domestic bonds and notes, selected regions, annualised, 
$bn 
Source: BIS, 2007 
 
Fig. 10.  Debt and interest payments, % of household disposable income, Turkey. 
Source: CBRT 2008 
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Fig. 11. Current account as % of GDP, selected developing countries 
Source: WEO, 2009. 
 
Fig. 12 . Current Account, Reserves and Short-term Capital Flows, Central and Eastern 
Europe, $bn. 
Source: WEO, 2009. 
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Fig. 13 . Current Account, Reserves and Short-term Capital Flows, Western Hemisphere, 
$bn. 
Source: WEO, 2009. 
 
Fig. 14 . Current Account, Reserves and Short-term Capital Flows, Emerging Asia, $bn. 
Source: WEO, 2009. 
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Fig. 15 . Current Account, Reserves and Short-term Capital Flows, Middle East, $bn. 
Source: WEO, 2009. 
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Table 1. Reserves of emerging and developing countries, $bn 
 
China India Russia Brazil Mexico Sub-Saharan Africa 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
2001 216.3 46.4 33.1 35.6 44.8 35.5 72.8 
2002 292 68.2 44.6 37.5 50.6 35.9 89.2 
2003 409.2 99.5 73.8 48.9 59 39.8 110.6 
2004 615.5 127.2 121.5 52.5 64.1 62.2 129.2 
2005 822.5 132.5 176.5 53.3 74.1 82.9 157.9 
2006 1069.5 171.3 296.2 85.2 76.3 115.8 196.3 
2007 1531.3 267.6 466.7 179.5 87.1 146.3 248.9 
2008 2134.5 271.7 421.3 192.9 94.6 163.5 258.6 
Source: WEO, IMF, 2009 
 
Table 2. Consumer loans as % of total loans of largest banks, Mexico 
Bank Year before merger 2006 
Banamex 6.25 (2000) 35.6 
Bancomer/BBVA 3.27 (1999) 23.9 
Serfin/Santander 1.18 (1999) 18.3 
Bital/HSBC 12.6 (2002) 21.1 
Banorte 1.78 (1999) 12.4 
Source: Lapavitsas and Dos Santos (2008).  
 
